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CENTER ON IRREGULAR WARFARE AND ARMED GROUPS



Operationalizing Intelligence Dominance

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Operationalizing Intelligence Dominance

Roy Godson

GODSON: *OPERATIONALIZING INTELLIGENCE DOMINANCE*

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Message from the Editors

In 2008, the Naval War College established the Center on Irregular Warfare & Armed Groups (CIWAG). CIWAG's primary mission is twofold: first, to bring cutting-edge research on Irregular Warfare into the Joint Professional Military Educational (JPME) curricula; and second, to bring operators, practitioners, and scholars together to share their knowledge and experiences about a vast array of violent and non-violent irregular challenges. This case study is part of an ongoing effort at CIWAG that includes symposia, lectures by world-renowned academics, case studies, research papers, articles, and books.

Dr. Roy Godson, the author of this case study, is president of the National Strategy Information Center in Washington, D.C. He is also Emeritus Professor of Government at Georgetown University. Dr. Godson has authored, coauthored, or edited more than 30 books and monographs, as well as numerous articles on issues related to national security, intelligence, and international relations. His case study provides a methodology for creating and maintaining intelligence dominance consistent with rule-of-law principles.

It is important to note three critical caveats to this case study. First, the opinions found in this case study are solely those of the author and do not represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Naval War College or CIWAG. Second, while every effort has been made to correct any factual errors in this work, the author is ultimately responsible for the content of this case study. Third, the study questions presented in all CIWAG case studies are written to provoke discussion on a wide variety of topics including strategic, operational, and tactical matters as well as ethical and moral questions confronted by operators in the battlefield. The point is to make these case studies part of an evolving and adaptive curriculum that fulfills the needs of students preparing to meet the challenges of the post-9/11 world and to show them the dilemmas that real people faced in high-pressure situations.

GODSON: *OPERATIONALIZING INTELLIGENCE DOMINANCE*

Compiled by the case study author and by CIWAG researchers at the Naval War College, the bibliography is a selection of the best books and articles on a range of related topics. We hope you find it useful, and look forward to hearing your feedback on the cases and suggestions for how you can contribute to the Center on Irregular Warfare & Armed Group's mission here at the Naval War College.

Author Biography

Dr. Roy Godson was elected president of the National Information Center in 1993. He is also Professor Emeritus of Government at Georgetown University. Dr. Godson has developed and managed educational and training programs on several continents, consulting extensively with governments, private sector organizations, and the United Nations' Office on Drug and Crime. He has also been working with educational officials, mass media, and religious institutions in Central and South America, the Caucasus, and the Middle East on the development of educational programs to prevent political violence, crime, and corruption by building and supporting a culture of lawfulness. He has authored or edited more than 20 books and numerous articles on a variety of security-related subjects, and is the founding editor of the quarterly journal *Trends in Organized Crime*.

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Acronyms and Terms

CI – counterintelligence

CONOPS – concept of operations

HN – host nation’s security and intelligence services

HUMIT – human intelligence

IRA – Irish Republican Army

MMP – model mentoring program

OPSEC – operational security

SIGINT – signals intelligence

TCG – tasking and coordination group

I. Introduction: The Global Security Environment

In recent decades, globalization has produced both positive trends, such as economic development, enhanced communications, and the dissemination of liberal values, and negative ones, including the globalization of crime, corruption, and terrorism, as well as the uncertainties inherent in a globalized economy, including instability and social unrest.¹ To effectively manage the contemporary security environment, the United States must be able to export local intelligence capabilities to foreign partners. A model of key elements of these capabilities has been developed that can be adapted relatively quickly for use by the U.S. in other countries. It is referred to as “intelligence dominance consistent with rule-of-law principles.”

Overall, the global security environment is characterized by several factors that are likely to persist for more than a decade. The first is the plethora of weak, fragile, failing, and failed states. More than half the world’s population lives in regions where governments are unable to control their territory. In 1945, there were approximately 50 relatively homogeneous nation-states. By the end of the 1990s, after decolonization and the demise of the Soviet Union, this number had grown to more than 190 heterogeneous states and now reaches approximately 200. Most of these newer, fragile states lack the police, administrative, and economic resources needed to govern effectively, and many cannot provide basic goods and services to significant sectors of their population. Their authority is challenged both within and outside their limited areas of territorial control. Conditions in these states often include border conflicts, diasporas, and other situations that have ramifications for their neighbors or the entire region.

The vacuum inside these states is being filled by armed groups and political movements that are growing in both numbers and capability.

¹ For an empirical analysis of the contemporary global security environment, see Roy Godson and Richard Shultz, *Adapting America’s Security Paradigm and Security Agenda*, Chapters 1-3 and Appendices 1 and 2.

They include terrorist, insurgent, militia, and criminal organizations that, in the main, use irregular methods of violence and strategic communication. These actors contest locally, regionally, and even globally for power, influence, and financial reward. The global competition for power, influence, and legitimacy that pits liberal and democratic government elements against authoritarian rulers, elites, warlords, opportunistic populists, tribal, ethnic, and extreme religious leaders leads to struggles for control of populations, territory, and resources.

Related to this are criminal economies based on trafficking in people, drugs, arms, or goods, counterfeiting of goods and services, and smuggling and kidnapping. These have become the major source of funds for multiple ethnic, religious, and insurgent groups in many parts of the world and comingle war, crime, and terrorism.

Military technological transformation has provided advanced Western countries such as the United States and Israel with unsurpassed conventional military technologies and capabilities—but not necessarily the winning edge in contemporary irregular conflicts. Furthermore, the rise of enhanced information gathering and communication techniques has been offset by a declining capability to identify and deal with violent small groups and individuals. These are able to hide in a globalized environment and use irregular tactics that are often impervious to conventional information capabilities.

Given the above security challenges, it can be expected that the United States will continue to seek to ensure that:

1. Adversarial states and nonstate actors do not gain influence or the political, military, economic, or cultural capabilities to threaten vital interests. These include key U.S. allies in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, as well as important trading routes such as the Persian Gulf, the Straits of Hormuz, and the Panama Canal.
2. Hostile and adversarial coalitions of states and nonstate actors do not become dominant or develop significant capabilities

in areas vital to quality of life, particularly in U.S.-adjacent territory (Mexico and the circum-Caribbean).

3. Liberal and fragile democratic governments at the national, provincial, and municipal levels receive effective assistance, as do certain nonstate groups and movements, particularly those facing adversarial ideological, corrupt, and criminal opponents.

To accomplish these objectives, the United States first will require knowledge about the capabilities and vulnerabilities of both adversarial and friendly foreign governments. The U.S. also will need detailed knowledge of the capabilities of foreign governments to maintain their own security in the face of internal and external threats, and will need to identify opportunities to secure the support of these governments for regional and global coalitions to enhance security.

A further crucial requirement is acquiring knowledge of significant foreign nonstate actors—particularly those that are or have been mobilized by adversarial coalitions or are potential new partners for such coalitions. Among the highest priorities will be foreign armed groups and sympathetic political/religious movements currently in existence or being formed. Groups and movements with an interest in the acquisition, sale, or use of WMDs or other massive disruptive capabilities will be among the groups of most concern. Al Qaeda, for instance, has been implicated in attempting to acquire WMDs and could potentially use them in the United States and the U.K.² However, other local, regional, and aspiring global movements have capabilities to threaten their own governments as well as key neighbors and more distant governments and movements. Nigeria's Islamist insurgent group Boko Haram is rumored to be allied with Al Qaeda and has gained influence over nearly half of the country.³ Similarly, Al Shabaab is in control of large sections of southern Somalia and is

² <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,277614,00.html>;
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/nov/14/alqaida.politics>

³ <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-nigeria-under-siege-20120407,0,647319.story>

launching successful operations in neighboring countries with the hopes of installing a larger overall caliphate ruled by Sharia law. It officially joined Al Qaeda in February 2012.⁴ In the 21st century, where micro actors can inflict macro damage at the local, regional, and even global levels, those having such a capability will be a major concern.

Understanding and monitoring the full spectrum of such groups is the precondition for identifying methods of neutralizing the hostile and assisting the friendly. However, the U.S. is not in a position to monitor half the world's population living in 100 fragile states, most with multiple armed groups. It can monitor some weak governments, more or less, but it does not have and is unlikely to develop the ground personnel with the requisite linguistic and cultural skill sets to provide and maintain coverage in 50 or more states. Hence, it will need to build partners and networks to help manage this challenge.

This case study is intended for those concerned with developing U.S. knowledge of intelligence dominance and exporting its basic elements to foreign partners. It covers the need for this capability and the model's key elements. It also discusses how these can be passed on to foreign partners, so that intelligence dominance consistent with rule-of-law principles can become a tool they can adapt to their national, provincial, and local needs. It will discuss key assumptions about U.S. policy requirements in the environment and identify main elements, including a discussion of the types of intelligence products to be developed, the major techniques and processes used to acquire these products, and the organization and management of these capabilities.

Discussion Questions

1. How are contemporary global security environments shaped by the emergence of new, violent nonstate actors?

⁴ http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/al_shabaab.html ; http://articles.cnn.com/2012-02-09/africa/world_africa_somalia-shabaab-qaeda_1_al-zawahiri-qaeda-somali-americans?_s=PM:AFRICA

2. In what global security environments do violent nonstate actors flourish, and why?
3. Is intelligence preparation of the operational environment essential before committing forces? Explain.
4. Why must the U.S. insist that the exportable model of intelligence dominance be consistent with rule-of-law and integrity principles?
5. How does “mapping” a group’s infrastructure and other details aid in operations? Is this mapping more useful for one facet of operations than another? Explain.

A. The Problem

U.S. intelligence has many effective capabilities, particularly the use of technology to collect information on foreign governments and their military forces and to find and fix hostile nonstate leaders. Effective “full-service” intelligence results from the interplay of four elements with overall security policy: collection, analysis, counterintelligence, and covert action. They are correlated with policy and the operations of other instruments of statecraft.

Collection entails the capture of information, either by informants (human intelligence, or HUMINT) or via electronic eavesdropping (signals intelligence, or SIGINT). In addition to strategic direction identifying major priorities, the collectors need analysts to guide them, to make sense of the “take,” and then to redirect them as gaps are identified. Analysts need collectors to learn bits and pieces of what is happening on the ground. They then collate the most important information and compile it into reports for policy makers. Both collectors and analysts need the protection of security and counterintelligence to intellectually vet collection from penetration and deliberate deception and fabrication: in 2010, a Russian spy ring in New York was exposed after allegedly

attempting to gain access to influential Americans.⁵ Covert action, which can shape and mitigate threats, benefits from all of the above and can contribute to collection and analysis. Intelligence contributes not only to policy making but also to kinetic and nonkinetic operations and vice versa. Military and diplomatic operations, if calibrated to do so, can contribute in significant ways to collection and analysis as well as the other elements of intelligence.⁶

The more this full-service symbiosis is recognized, managed, and institutionalized, the better the results. Relying on one or more elements without this “symbiotic calibration” reduces the strategic advantage that effective intelligence confers. The U.S. itself will benefit from developing and deploying these skills. It will also benefit from being able to mentor foreign security services in the skills necessary for full-service capabilities in diverse geopolitical environments.

Even when the U.S. is the major force on the ground, it is often not well configured to obtain detailed information about the local environments it is fighting to control. For example, the Marine general who commanded the First Marine Division in the taking of Fallujah, Iraq in November 2004, told a Marine Corps oral history interviewer:

We really didn't know what we were going to find in that city. I mean there were no doubts in my mind about our Marines. I knew we would be victorious. ... We did find some chemical labs. We found a lot of what were coined “torture chambers,” slaughter houses. ... I never imagined the amount of ordnance and weapons we would find. ... We found propaganda factories. I didn't realize how entrenched the insurgents were in the city.⁷

⁵ <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10442223>

⁶ For a breakdown of the importance of collection, analysis, counterintelligence, and covert action and their symbiotic relationship in the world of intelligence, see Roy Godson, *Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards? U.S. Covert Action and Counterintelligence* (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2000).

⁷ U.S. Marine Corps History Division, Oral History Interview with Maj. Gen. Richard F. Natonski, 16 March, 2005.

Although U.S. intelligence practices have improved since then and there have been significant successes, major elements of U.S. intelligence doctrine about the local environment have not kept pace, even in regions where U.S. forces are heavily committed.⁸ The same is true in regions vital to U.S. interests where governments are challenged by local adversarial armed groups.

B. The Solution

The United States can substantially increase the coverage of this population, particularly local armed groups, by encouraging and securing the cooperation of the local security and intelligence services (hereafter referred to as host nations, or HN). It then can train them to develop the requisite skill sets to complement U.S. capabilities, particularly the technological and sophisticated capabilities that most weak states would not otherwise have for many years to come.

What is needed to accomplish this is a relatively simple, low-tech, exportable intelligence model that would be appealing to governments of areas of particular interest to the United States. This model would not utilize U.S. techniques or methods that are proprietary or classified, many of which are expensive and technologically sophisticated. The U.S. must, however, insist that the exportable model be consistent with rule-of-law and integrity principles.

In recent decades, the U.S. and other democracies have established bodies of law, guidelines, and oversight mechanisms to help ensure that their own intelligence practitioners are guided in the performance of their professional duties by rule-of-law principles. These laws and guidelines never operate perfectly. And it cannot be expected that relatively new and fragile democracies confronted with threats to their existence will be able

⁸ See for example, Major General Michael T. Flynn, Captain Matt Pottinger, Paul D. Batchelor, "Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan," Center for New American Security, January 4, 2010. Gen. Flynn was Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence in Afghanistan. <http://www.cnas.org/node/3924>

to match these standards in the short term. However, it is possible to insist on the inclusion of human rights, rule-of-law principles, and integrity/anti-corruption education in U.S. foreign assistance programs for foreign police, security, and intelligence personnel.

Such an intelligence model has been developed and tested. It has been and continues to be used in the U.K. and other democracies. The U.S. has tested the model, working first with Iraqi police in Anbar and later with the Iraqi Army in other provinces; it is now also in use in parts of Afghanistan. The essence of the model is developing the local knowledge to enable military and/or police operational forces to degrade, disrupt, and neutralize armed group challenges to governmental authority within the confines of the rule of law.

The key characteristic of the model that differentiates it from other models of foreign intelligence in democratic societies is the development of systematic local knowledge. This model builds from the ground up. The local level feeds the regional or national center to aid in strategic decision making while also facilitating local tactical decision making.

The focus of the products, process, and organization of this approach is not on the centers of other governments' power—i.e., the state, its central command and control, its strategic culture, its capabilities. **The focus of this model is on the local people, the street, and the land: the local level.** This is “intelligence among the people,” consistent with rule-of-law principles. One example is the U.S. Army Human Intelligence Teams in Afghanistan: among other tasks, members collect anthropological interviews to gather information on individuals at the local level in order to better understand relationships of all players in a specific area.⁹

⁹ For further reading on Human Terrain Teams, see Jacob Kipp, Lester Grau, Karl Prinslow, and Don Smith, “The Human Terrain System: A CORDS for the 21st Century,” *Military Review*, September-October 2006, http://www.army.mil/professionalWriting/volumes/volume4/december_2006/12_06_2.html, accessed April 9, 2012

The products are detailed knowledge—mapping—of above-ground preferences, proclivities, political movements, and power brokers, as well as specific detailed mapping of the underground (illegal) structures of such movements in the region. These “maps” enable the police, military, and other elements of law enforcement to identify and target¹⁰ criminals with precision and within the confines of the law, even if there is little or no violence at any given time. This precision enables intelligence to focus on armed groups while interfering with the local population as little as possible, which is vitally important if community support for the security forces is to be maintained.

Above-ground armed group leaders and operatives present a special problem. Some individuals will be identified as belonging to an organization that has legal and/or even “charitable” purposes. As individuals, they may not be committing violent criminal acts themselves; that is, they are not physically assisting or conspiring to assist the underground or acting in a violent manner. Some, however, are “dual-hatted.” They have two lives or careers—one above and one below ground. It is the second career that makes them subject to targeting, such as the medical doctor or religious figure who is also a Mafia or terrorist leader.

Based on intelligence, leaders and active participants in the underground are to be targeted, recruited, or, if possible, arrested. This is not only humane and consistent with the rule of law but also, when skillfully handled by intelligence and the democratic polity, more productive. If their violent resistance or whereabouts makes arrest impossible or costly in terms of human life, then other specific procedures (and rules of engagement) are required.

¹⁰ *Identify* here means finding evidence or proof that indicates that a specific person is violating criminal law and therefore can be targeted by police, military, or intelligence operations; *target* means operations to arrest or detain identified persons, as well as their conviction and imprisonment, unless the person is willing to cooperate under rule-of-law procedures.

C. Maps

The underground or “infrastructure” of a mature group, such as Northern Ireland’s Irish Republican Army (IRA), is usually organized into a cell structure or a military structure. In addition to its command and control unit (executive committee), the infrastructure includes the following:

- a financial subgroup that acquires and administers the group’s funds, usually by illegal means. The IRA used funding from Catholic sympathizers in the United States and elsewhere, as well as alleged funding from Libya’s Moammar Gaddafi, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and Basque separatists; it also collected funds through such criminal measures as kidnapping and extortion;
- a “military” wing that trains for and uses assorted forms of irregular violence. The IRA’s “Green Book” provided trainees with instruction in—among other topics— military operations, propaganda techniques, and resistance techniques for interrogation;
- a security component that “protects” the organization from penetration by adversaries, whether government forces, ideological dissenters, or other armed groups. The IRA relied on a group of specialists to identify informants and British penetration of its organization and promoted clandestine tradecraft among IRA operatives;
- an intelligence wing that guides the underground and its operations, e.g., the names and lifestyles of potential targets;
- a supply wing, the “quartermaster,” that secures tools of the trade such as weapons, supplies, documents, methods of communication. The IRA made its own weapons and had a group of engineers working for them;
- a propaganda and strategic communication wing that develops narratives and communicates them both through

underground and the above-ground network of journalists and sympathetic politicians and community leaders. Sinn Fein was the political wing of the IRA and served as its mouthpiece; and

- a recruitment subgroup with the capability to spot, assess, and train new recruits.

These must be mapped by HN intelligence so that strategy and operations can be formulated and conducted with maximum effect.

Maps of the active population also provide evidence of incipient armed groups. Are there groups with criminal or extremist ideologies in formation? How serious or potentially serious are they? What can be done legally—consistent with the rule of law—to distract, persuade, or channel these groups into more constructive directions before they mature and become major problems?

These maps also identify which other local groups, political movements, leaders, and networks may be helpful in separating the people from the adversarial armed group. This is crucial. The U.S. and friendly fragile governments cannot be expected to “immunize” the entire population from the blandishments and threats of mature adversarial armed groups on their own. They need local allies, preferably those who carry local moral and legal authority and who have a capacity to compete with the attractions, narratives, skills, and capabilities of adversarial armed groups. It is essential to understand the motivations of potentially supportive local actors and what they can be expected to achieve, as seen in Afghanistan’s Anbar Awakening in 2006-2007, when local sheiks pledged to assist U.S. forces against the insurgency on the basis of mutual security interests. Only by obtaining and retaining local knowledge can decisions be made about the extent and continuity of support to them.

In sum, this intelligence provides the capability to dominate the local battle space. It provides preventive intelligence before an armed group becomes powerful enough to conduct multiple violent operations. If it is well developed and truly dominant over the security and intelligence of the armed group, it can even provide intelligence during ongoing enemy

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operations. It also provides intelligence after the attacks—who conducted them and why. Intelligence dominance provides the basis for neutralizing and degrading adversarial groups.

II. Principal Elements of an Exportable Model

The next three sections are focused on the elements of the exportable model. We first discuss the principal elements of the local units; the role of the regional/provincial units and integration at the national level follows.

Discussion Questions

1. Which type of local-level intelligence collection is relatively easy to obtain?
2. What benefits do police forces bring to the table at the local level of intelligence collection?
3. What critical human elements must exist between police forces and the local intelligence unit for this model to be effective?
4. Deconfliction is an important aspect of regional-level tasking and coordination. What other functions are specific to this level of operational intelligence?
5. Regional commanders often have to make difficult timely decisions without the benefit of explicitly clear intelligence. What personnel other than those described below would you use to arrive at your decision, and why?
6. What is the role of intelligence control strategy at the national level?

A. The Local Level

The local level is key. It is the only place to obtain systematic, detailed knowledge of the people and their friendly and adversarial groups and movements. This can be supported by national-level collection systems and analysis, but only the local level can provide systematic crucial information.

The first step to a locally oriented intelligence capability is to divide a region or key municipalities into specific geographic sections, essentially a grid. Then a small intelligence unit is established for each or most grid sections. (See Figure 2.)

This unit does three types of intelligence collection: basic, infrastructure, and target. (See Figure 1.)

1. Basic intelligence identifies important existing features of a particular geographic section. This includes specific human terrain mapping—key activists, leaders and influential people, communications, modes, financial, and political social networks; existing armed groups and subgroups, and groups in an embryonic stage of development. It is block-by-block, village-by-village knowledge. For this coverage, collectors initially establish networks of people in each of these areas. These consist of diverse human sources, not just controlled confidential agents or high-level controlled informants. These sources are usually relatively easy to obtain through the local police or military—whoever is out there every day. Perhaps as much as 40 percent of the personnel/resources assigned to each local unit are assigned to basic intelligence.

2. Infrastructure intelligence, by contrast, focuses on the “order of battle” of armed groups: their membership, activities, and intentions. It also consists of data on the political beliefs and dogmas of group leaders; group operational doctrine and strategy; organizational structure; and linkages with states and other groups. Approximately 90 percent of this information is from confidential sources recruited and managed by “hybrid” case officers (see below) with intimate knowledge of the local culture and language in which the groups operate. Tactical local signals intelligence (SIGINT) and imagery from various sensors (e.g., aerial surveillance) collected locally supports case officers’ human collection. Other important methods, such as local interrogation,

also yield information about local groups.¹¹ Case officers are supported by a local analyst who identifies collection gaps, is familiar with all source knowledge, and helps identify specific targets to exploit. Another supporting analytical task is the near real-time exploitation of captured documents, computers, and so forth, either taken in the geographic setting or in another section of the local grid.

3. The third type of collection is local target intelligence. This pinpoints the activities and movements of adversarial group leaders and personnel, information that can be speedily exploited. The information is derived from all sources: local, regional, and national systems and local agents, SIGINT, imagery, and interrogation. It can provide continual live coverage of the selective targets and is derived from and augmented by basic and infrastructure intelligence.

Personnel and Structure

The local unit will be comprised of several types of people or skill sets (see Figure II, B), including hybrid case officers. This term refers to professionals who are familiar with both law enforcement intelligence techniques and the traditional clandestine techniques usually associated with foreign intelligence in hostile environments. These case officers are expected to identify, assess, recruit, and manage confidential sources in a position to provide access to the above- and below-ground leaders and operations of the armed groups in their sector.

The case officers receive specific requirements from the unit's chief, who receives requirements from the regional and national levels. The unit chief and his team then turn these requirements into specific questions and decide how best to acquire the required information—what could be obtained from local SIGINT or imagery, for example, and what

¹¹ "Interrogation" means official detention and questioning of suspects in the grid sector by a trained specialist, quickly, and in cooperation with local case officers and a local analyst before a suspect is sent for processing and trial.

must be obtained from recruited human sources or detainees, and over what period of time. Local unit personnel meet almost daily and are responsible for reporting their specific methods and sources as well as their view of the reliability of their sources to the local unit chief, who reports to the regional or provincial level.

For example, a local unit might task recruited informants about the personnel in the local armed group they know or have access to. Who are the leaders, and what are their strengths and weaknesses? What are the important political and other differences that affect their cooperation and interaction? Who specifically makes up the cell's rank and file? What skills do they possess, and how committed are they to the group and its cause? What are the cell's physical capabilities—houses, weapons caches, bomb-making facilities? What are the sources and details of finance—kidnapping, extortion, smuggling goods, gasoline, drugs, foreign contributions? Who is responsible for securing community support or passivity? Who writes or makes videos, and how are they distributed? Who in the group is responsible for providing financial contributions or goods for the community? Who in the group resolves disputes or imposes “justice” in the community?

The local case officer would be familiar with local culture and would operate under official or “thin” cover. One of the most successful models of developing this capability has been built upon using the intelligence and/or special branch of the police. The British in particular have repeatedly used this approach, and more recently the United States has found it effective in Iraq and Afghanistan. Why the police? First, the police have stations in each grid section. They are very well placed to gather most of the basic intelligence as well as a great deal of infrastructure and target intelligence on a regular basis. They have a relatively secure place to operate from and to store basic equipment, such as computers, desks, files, and safes. Second, they are to some extent physically protected from armed attack by the regular, uniformed police at the station, as opposed to operating from safe houses.

Third, police officers on the beat usually have unparalleled access to the community on a continual basis. Patrolling daily, particularly in urban areas, they are among the few officials who know who is who and who is a stranger, and can identify anomalies or unusual happenings on the street and in the community, such as new or odd people, cars, money, shops, and so on. They can also be tasked to provide simple elements of basic intelligence—who associates with whom, what the local power relationships and above-ground affiliations and activities are, the presence of specific license plates. When effectively tasked and when the information is organized, these products can be used to verify and amplify information from recruited confidential sources.

In addition, the local police are tasked to follow lawful procedures. They may not always do so, but they operate within a legal framework. Further, they are in a position to grant or withhold “favors”—to help those who help them by, for example, assisting with local bureaucrats, obtaining construction or building permits, or withholding such favors. This is not a “corrupt” relationship. It is normal human interaction to be especially helpful to those who are helpful. And these eyes and ears on the streets have proven to be very useful on a daily basis.


If for one reason or another it is not feasible or desirable to use the police for this function (e.g., if the local population or the local police are hostile to the intelligence unit), the case officers and their colleagues will need to seek out other physical accommodations such as a walled-off compound in a military facility. This has the advantage of being a relatively secure facility for personnel, equipment, interrogation, and collection of intelligence. It may lead to closer cooperation with local military commanders and their operational units. But its disadvantage is that it is further removed from the people and basic sources of knowledge. In practice, both types of “forward operating bases” have been successful.

When the local unit is up and functioning and much of the composition of the adversarial armed group has been identified and can be separated from the friendly or passive population, the unit will be in a position to provide the local military or police special forces with target

intelligence necessary to neutralize the local group's activities with precision. This may include capturing or shutting down safe houses and bomb factories, seizing weapons, financial or other logistical capabilities, and accessing computers, reports, and documents that would identify adversarial penetration or recruitment of local police, military, or intelligence operatives in the local area, or in nearby areas.

To be effective, the local intelligence unit must have an almost seamless relationship (see Figure 2C) with local military and/or police forces. The military and police must be willing to trust the local intelligence unit and the information and warnings they provide. Military operators in turn can be of considerable assistance to the local intelligence units, either by assisting in their daily collection, such as tasking their daily checkpoints and patrols to report on specific anomalies, or by intentionally not interfering with the local unit's collection, for example, not having patrols or checkpoints in a specific area where meetings with informants are scheduled on a given day.

Figure 1. Collection Products






Figure 2. Organization for Dominance

B. The Regional Level: Regional Tasking and Coordination Groups

The next step up the organizational and production ladder is the regional unit. This may be a citywide entity, made up of local units in a given city, or a provincial or statewide entity. Sometimes, only one or more cities or provinces may be interested in having the capability. In that case, the organizational and production ladder goes no further. Although there may be intelligence in a given region or city, there would be no national dominance system.

There are several ways to use, organize, and execute the regional function. Diverse countries have developed diverse arrangements. No matter the arrangement, there has to be a decision on who and which part of the security establishment is in charge at both the regional and the national levels—the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior’s security service, or the national or regional police. Arrangements will also have to be made with the prosecutor’s office, relevant oversight judges, and the prison system. For the system to be most efficient, all will cooperate. There must be a clear-cut chain of command, from the local to the regional to the national command, and then to the elected political leadership.

Frustration will be minimized and efficiency maximized when all relevant leaders up and down the chain of command understand what the system is designed to achieve and how their agency fits into the picture, at all levels. A common “language” or culture must exist to further maximum cooperation among the relevant players, operators, commanders, judges, and politicians. Whichever ministry or agency is in charge, the function of the central command unit, also called the tasking and coordination group, is to task, coordinate, provide services to, and “protect” local units.

Responsibilities and Desks

The regional process begins with collating the collection products of the local units to disseminate to other regions and to the national level,

and back down to its local units. First, the region transmits and monitors national collection priorities to the local unit commanders, who collect to the specifications of national needs, translated into local requirements. The second function of the region is to coordinate and sometimes adjudicate the collection conducted by the local units, as well as the particular requests of national intelligence agencies with a specific interest in personnel or activities in the region. It is responsible for managing, coordinating, and deconflicting local units in its region and coordinates the work of the local units to ensure cooperation between local units.

Infrastructure activities and likely target personnel cross geographic grids, often operating across borders. Collection thus must be coordinated between local grid sectors. For example, as hostile armed groups physically move across the boundaries of two or more local units, there needs to be coordination as to who is responsible for what among the local units. Which local unit will be targeting which individual as he moves from the territory of one unit to another? If one local unit is recruiting a person who lives in their city, what happens if another unit identifies the same person as working in their zone and wants to recruit the target? The regional TCG is responsible for knowing about and deciding which local unit is to take responsibility for recruiting and running the target—the unit in the home city, or the unit in the workplace. Alternately, are two units meeting their agents in the same vicinity on any given night? To avoid having too much local presence (too many strange cars in the proposed meeting area), the TCG will recommend alternatives such as changing the meeting of one unit to another night. This is known as deconfliction.

Specialist support can also be available at the regional level from national Special Forces, surveillance units, imagery, and other sources not always available locally. Covert exploitation, via tasking the appropriate agency, and coordination can also be controlled from the region. This is part of the normal management chain, with regional managers overseeing local managers. Collection also often needs to be coordinated with other regions, as well as with national intelligence services that have the reach

to collect and exploit infrastructure and target intelligence about armed groups operating abroad. This regional coordination function would be undertaken by a small staff of regional managers and operators and would include representatives from operational agencies whose assistance is often important to effective collection and exploitation.

A third regional function is the collation and analysis of the collection take of the local units in the region. This is run by regional “desks,” staffed mostly by analysts. These products include sanitized agent reports, the judgments of the local unit, or assessments and answers to collection tasks assigned by the national level. They may be sent horizontally to other regions and vertically up and down to the national level and the region’s local units.

The desks producing these analytical products can be organized in diverse ways. They may be functionally or theme-oriented (e.g., concerned with the finances of particular armed groups in the region), or group-focused (e.g., concerned with the overall strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities of specific groups). They are responsible for compiling a knowledge base of the key groups, associated factions, rivals, personalities and structures, or specialized subjects such as group finances. On a weekly basis the desks would prepare overview reports, including metrics. They will also be able to note gaps in coverage, anomalies in local reporting, and how regional knowledge reinforces or conflicts with reporting from other regions or the national level.

A desk can be created or disbanded to meet the current national requirement and the particular circumstances in each region. Each desk, however, would be run by one or two supervisory staff, with one or more analysts and support staff, who are subject matter specialists. Together with the desk’s files and databases, they will become the institutional memory of the region.

A fourth function of the regional office is providing enhanced security and counterintelligence (CI) for both the operations of the local units and the products of the analytical desks. Full-service intelligence involves both CI and security production for collection and analysis, as

well as the option of using knowledge of adversary intelligence for “offensive” purposes, that is, to neutralize and disrupt the adversary’s intelligence and security operations.

A small CI regional desk with both analytical and operational capabilities would be necessary. It will provide assistance with vetting local sources (through databases and other reporting) and also review the validity of the operations and reports emanating from interaction with these sources. The CI desk would also have the operational capability to investigate security breakdowns or anomalies, whether spotted by the analytical desks in the region or by other regions, national sources or capabilities, or the concerns raised by a local unit. The local units can and should be responsible for the security of their own operations (OPSEC). But they cannot be expected, on their own, to conduct secure and sometimes sensitive investigations of their sources or staff. A dedicated CI group, including a surveillance and investigative capability, reporting to the senior regional commander, is required.

The regional CI desks would also be responsible for implementing nationally tasked offensive operations through their coordination of the local level. The region may also come up with offensive ideas and programs that have to be approved and coordinated with the other regions through the national-level CI coordination function.

The regional levels probably also need to have an informant-handling unit apart from the capabilities of the local units. This is because a local-level informant may be living and working in a grid section where meetings with case officers may be too risky, particularly in small communities, or the source is deemed so important that special handling is required to protect and take full advantage of the source. In these situations, the regional office would be able to handle the source and his or her information more effectively than the local unit. This regional unit can also assist local units who need to meet local sources outside their local jurisdictions.

The Central Command Unit

The heart and soul of the regional organization is its central command unit, which the British some years ago dubbed the tasking and coordination group (TCG) (see Figure 2, Regional TCG). This function exists at the regional level. There is also a national-level TCG (described later) that controls the regional TCGs. The national level sets the regional intelligence requirements and receives the take. It also provides policy guidelines and budgetary parameters for the regional level and oversees regional intelligence production, operation, and compliance with the guidelines, resource allocation, and budget.

However, it is the regional-level TCG that applies and oversees the local unit's production and implementation. The regional TCG supports the national TCG. It is the intermediary between national policy making and local knowledge acquisition and its regional exploitation. How rapidly and effectively the regional TCG works is a second key to overall intelligence effectiveness. There needs to be a capability to focus all relevant government resources and all local and regional resources on key targets. Usually, this is not easy; intelligence is rarely clear-cut. There will be clues and pieces of information and divergent views on the significance and validity of this information among both intelligence and operational units. Time is usually of the essence. The key task of the regional commander therefore is to screen out "noise" and integrate the diverse views of local units and other agencies into coherent, surgical exploitation. Commanders must be sensitive, flexible, and open to diverse inputs, but at the same time they are required to be clear and decisive, so their decisions are understood in their own and in partner agencies.

Indeed, one of the key differences between 20th-century state-centric warfare and 21st-century "irregular" war is the importance of the acquisition of granular local knowledge and its rapid exploitation, so that armed groups and coalitions (or groups and their state partners) can be neutralized through a variety of kinetic and nonkinetic operations. Preparing and deploying skilled TCG team managers, analysts, and operators at the regional level is vital.

This group should include a regional commander who is responsible for supervising and coordinating local operations through (a) his Operations commander, who is in frequent contact with local unit commanders and the region's police, military, and other government operational forces; and (b) his Intelligence Unit commander, responsible for all the region's intelligence desks, and particularly for the acquisition and dissemination of all actionable intelligence to partner governmental organizations in the region on a 24/7 basis. This regional command will also usually need a small special support desk to identify, on a 24/7 basis, information or operations that could further be exploited through TCG-controlled functions or those of partner agencies, to make a reality of the slogan "intelligence is operations."

Sample Weekly Schedule

Effective regional commanders would follow a notional weekly schedule approximating the one shown in Table 1.

The remainder of the week would be devoted to regional and local coordination, deconfliction, exploitation, and preparation for the following week's cycle. Needless to say, there would also be daily contact between the regions and the national TCG staff, and as required, the national-level TCG commanders.

Other important matters such as human resource issues, management, business, and equipment issues at the local and regional levels would not be subjects discussed through the distinctive TCG channels. The regional TCG would be focused only on tasking, coordination, and production and exploitation.

<i>Monday:</i> PM:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ♦Operations and analysis submanagers review current priorities, threats, and operations to anticipate weekly tasking to regional desks and local units; and resources coordination required for and from regional partner agencies. ♦Written report prepared for regional commander.
<i>Tuesday</i> AM:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ♦Regional commander's decision on weekly priority threats and required resources, coordination. ♦Region's written proposals forwarded to national TCG staff to prepare agenda for national and regional TCG weekly meeting.
PM:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ♦National and regional TCG commanders meet via electronic means (phone, video teleconferencing, e-mail) to review current national priorities, new information, urgent tasking and coordination, any necessary resource reconfiguration and deconfliction necessary. ♦Tasking and coordination decision relayed to regional sub-commanders, local units, and cooperating partners, i.e., what, if anything, has changed in response to national priorities, new information and analysis, and resource allocation.

Table 1. Sample TCG Schedule

C. The National Level: National Tasking and Coordination Group

The national (or strategic) TCG develops and reviews the national strategic assessment and an intelligence control strategy to ensure that the national intelligence system and regional operations are coordinated. It also advises on the use of intelligence in achieving national policy

objectives. The national TCG can provide a vehicle for informing other national-level leaders on regional events and issues that may have national and international significance. It also provides a focal point for accountability to the minister in charge and has responsibility for security screening, vetting, and operational security for its own or headquarters personnel.

Responsibilities

The national strategic assessment identifies the threats and challenges that armed groups are likely to present over the medium to long term (one year and longer), as well as resulting intelligence, current issues, and those likely to emerge. Threat assessments, produced on a biannual basis, need to be reviewed every three months to ensure that they are current. The assessment would focus on what is currently known about the groups (their maturation, strategy, capabilities, and tactics) and key gaps in knowledge that need to be filled.

A second function of this TCG is to develop collection and analytical priorities, sometimes called the intelligence control strategy. This document sets the agenda for regional intelligence collection, analysis, and exploitation. Based on a critical examination of the findings of the strategic assessment, it provides senior headquarters and regional management with a framework in which decisions can be made about the issues that should take precedence in resource allocation. It identifies requirements, gaps to be closed, and specific regional tasking. After the TCG reviews and sets the control strategy, it meets regularly (every three to four months) to review and monitor progress or adjust the strategy.

The national TCG prepares and tasks regional TCGs with the intelligence control strategy and manages its regional implementation. It also draws together and synthesizes the analytical products of the regional TCGs and disseminates them to national policy makers. Managers and their staff identify gaps and operations priorities that need to be addressed by the regions and their local units. For example, if two or more regions are reporting outstanding results and other regions are not, the national

TCG staff will try to make sense of this disparity and how to reduce the shortfalls.

It can also provide early warning and reporting to the minister in charge about current or emerging regional and local issues of national and international salience. This would focus on intelligence (and other government operations based on intelligence) on topics such as raids, trials, critical incidents, or media coverage that are likely to affect public confidence and impact communities.

To help reinforce the rule-of-law culture within the regional and local units, it could serve as a single point of contact for government oversight and accountability for regional and local intelligence activities. This would also provide a mechanism for rapid investigation of and public response to reported violations of official intelligence doctrine.

The national TCG would also play a role in ensuring the operational security of the TCG as a whole, and it would assist and protect the security of intelligence-related documents passed to senior leaders in direct contact with or negotiating with representatives of armed groups.

Staff and Structure

In many ways, the organization of the national TCG would mirror that of the regional TCG, with submanagers and staff for both intelligence and operations. On the intelligence analysis side, there would be theme- and group-oriented desks collating materials from the regions and incorporating products from national-level intelligence collection/analytical systems and open sources. On the operational side, most of the staff would be experienced practitioners who have moved up the ranks from the local to regional levels and are familiar with the extensive paperwork and approvals for operations required both for effectiveness and for ensuring that the system remains consistent with the principles of the rule of law.

National subcommanders would review the weekly reports and requests of the regional commanders. They also would participate in the weekly (electronic) meeting of the regions. The most senior national TCG

commander would be responsible to the minister-in-charge. He/she would attend relevant meetings of other intelligence services, ministries, and foreign partners.

One of the main doctrinal decisions to be made is the extent of fusion in the TCG, particularly at the top. There is little doubt that fusion between the intelligence operators and analysts should take place at the local and regional levels, particularly when the subject is targeting armed groups and their active personnel. There the intelligence is fragile and time is of the essence. However, in the longer-term assessment function, some would make a case for more separation. Speed is not of the essence in longer-term intelligence collection; detached observation and reflection is the higher priority. The solution here may not be organizational but may lie with the leadership of commanders who recognize this dilemma and develop flexible methods of resolving it.

III. Exporting the Model

This model provides a proven intelligence architecture. It enables a rule-of-law-oriented democracy to combat hostile nonstate internal actors by collecting and using locally derived information. Here, we discuss how to export the model or capability. How could a democracy such as the United States successfully assist new and fragile democracies to embed this concept into their preexisting security and intelligence infrastructure? Additionally, how could the U.S. assist in developing such a capability from the ground up in concert with weak partner governments?

The answer is by developing and maintaining a comprehensive planning and mentoring program to assist a foreign partner's security and intelligence structure. This will be referred to as the Model Mentoring Program (MMP). The MMP seeks to infuse the intelligence dominance model into part or all of the operations of a nascent or already existing Host Nation security structure—a transformation that would result in increasingly sophisticated and efficient intelligence-driven operations on the part of the HN. To illustrate how the MMP could be implemented, two environments will be considered: (1) when U.S. forces are already heavily and operationally embedded within the allied nation; and (2) when there is not substantial U.S. military presence in the country.

Discussion Questions

1. What additional elements would MMP and HN planners incorporate into a comprehensive doctrine that would take into account the host nation's atmospherics?
2. Explain why doctrinal drift would present a challenge to MMP mentors.
3. The "doctrinal group" should include senior members of the HN service. Why?

4. Why is it necessary to have a uniformed member manage and supervise a military sponsored MMP? What about in a conflict environment?
5. List some of the reasons why sustained interactive mentoring at every level of operation is fundamental for success.
6. What methods could facilitate effective integration of the intelligence dominance model by the MMP?
7. How can information-sharing agreements positively affect the mentoring program?
8. Host nation “buy-in” for the MMP is a must for it to be successful. How can the MMP ensure indigenous support for the long term?
9. What major differences are there to exporting the intelligence dominance model for states that do not seek a conventional U.S. military presence?
10. Without U.S. military forces involved, who is responsible for identifying which host nation units to partner with? What variables must be considered when selecting these partners?

A. Exporting the Capability With a Current U.S. Military Presence

This first environment is one in which the U.S. has a formidable military presence that is authorized to conduct independent operations in the HN and has identified the maturation of HN military and police forces as a strategic goal. This scenario is directly analogous to the U.S. military presence in Iraq prior to the signing of the conventional Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) in 2008. U.S. forces provided considerable assistance to its security structures and were able to encourage and support reforms with infusions of funding, supplies, and mentors. Iraq, while not supportive of all U.S. designs, was interested in developing its own capabilities, including U.S.-supported security reform in consultation and with the approval of Iraqi officials. Personnel assigned to mentoring Iraq

officers served within a relatively permissive security environment, enjoying the protection of U.S. and Iraqi forces. They were able to regularly interact with their partnered Iraqi element at the national, regional, or local levels.

The existing presence of a significant U.S. military force will make it easier to persuade the Host Nation that the United States can help it install the intelligence dominance model in one or more regions. There already will be a U.S. infrastructure and planning methods in place for concluding important security agreements with the HN, and there will be U.S. senior military leaders inside the country who have the confidence of key ministers (e.g. defense, interior/intelligence). And although foreign mentors will need to be recruited, important U.S. logistical, communications, and supportive intelligence capabilities that can assist in building the dominance capability will already be in the country. There still will be significant obstacles to overcome to developing the MMP and productive HN local dominance capabilities, but it has been done in parts of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Given these circumstances, an MMP program would need to successfully execute two central objectives:

1. The creation or refinement of an intelligence capability that can immediately aid U.S. and local military forces in the prosecution of a campaign against irregular warfare adversaries; and
2. Preparation of an autonomous indigenous intelligence capability that is fully integrated within the government and can operate independently of external support upon the cessation of large-scale U.S. military operations.

MMP managers and personnel, in conjunction with host nation partners, would initially prepare a comprehensive doctrine and an operational phased plan. This doctrine and plan would benefit from successful real-world examples culled from historic and recent conflicts. It would focus on current in-country requirements and circumstances. A

prerequisite for the adoption of the model would be a joint feasibility study or survey that would be used to develop a phased plan and adapt the doctrine to the local HN environment. Once deemed acceptable by all parties, the doctrine could then be implemented through a widespread mentoring program involving the requisite number of experienced mentors. These mentors, consistently guided by the plan and doctrine, would be deployed at the local, regional, and national levels of HN operations and would work full-time with partner personnel.

Although afforded significant advantages by a large-scale U.S. military presence, an MMP in this scenario would need to be mindful of a range of often unpredictable factors that can delay and endanger program success. To mitigate risk, the MMP must follow a methodical, regular, and transparent process of adaptation, revision of the written doctrine, and mentoring.

Doctrine and Planning

Due to the key role played in HN force development initiatives in the recent Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, much attention has been paid to the professional backgrounds and skills—or lack thereof—of individuals charged with building the police and military forces of both nations. Critics have suggested that neither the U.S. military nor the American interagency process possess the requisite number of skilled personnel to immediately and effectively build a HN security capability, forcing those charged with overseeing the effort to be overly reliant on contractors or other external sources.

This focus on the trainers versus an examination of the material they are assigned to convey is limiting. Too little attention has been paid to the quality, form, and origin of the detailed doctrine that guides mentoring initiatives. Recognizing the pivotal role of doctrine, the Model Mentoring Plan would seek, before the deployment of any assets, to review the existing documents on doctrine for dominance. If this is not suitable or needs further adaptation, it will be necessary to author and

finalize a comprehensive description of the model, the phases of the plan, and how, precisely, they would be realized in-country.

MMP doctrine would be formulated specifically to pass on to the HN security service the procedures, processes, and methods necessary to maintain an intelligence-driven campaign for local intelligence dominance. Even when the U.S. is the major force on the ground, it is not usually configured to obtain detailed information about the local environments it is fighting to control.¹² The doctrine thus would offer detailed guidance on the full spate of organized intelligence activity, from management and tasking to operations. Concerning procedures, MMP doctrine would include advisories on the proper structure of HN offices at the local, regional, and national levels, including recommended staffing levels, requisite skill sets, and expected resource allocations—of money, vehicles, work space—at all levels of operations.

The doctrine would also include the description of specific operational methods, including the recruitment and management of sources, the conduct of surveillance, the protection of sources, and analytical tradecraft, operations security, and so forth. At every level of description, the doctrine would convey how each specific institution, procedure, or method integrates within the overall model-based construct.

The possession of this core doctrine is particularly important with regard to the instruction of a security/intelligence element. Given their inherently complex and sophisticated nature, intelligence methods and procedures require precise and regular explanation. Misunderstandings, referencing of individual experiences, or unsupervised deviations on the part of mentors could quickly lead to uneven implementation and the facilitation of competing partial models within the HN service. To avoid this, mentors and foreign students alike must be steeped in one doctrine, leading to the adoption of implementation throughout the HN element. Because the MMP may be conducted over an extensive geographical area, mentors will enjoy significant independence, increasing the opportunities

¹² See for example, Flynn, et al. “Fixing Intel:” op cit.

for their unregulated deviation. Enforced adherence to the central doctrine is a key brake on doctrinal drift, in which focus shifts to a different, sometimes less important, area or tangent.

The doctrine also provides mentors and HN operators alike with intelligence practices consistent with the rule of law. This is important. Although the mentors—at least initially—would be drawn from liberal democracies, they often would be applying the doctrine in regions with little cultural experience in rule of law and many temptations and incentives to circumvent rule-of-law practices. Hence the doctrine would be designed to anchor mentors and HN practitioners alike in rule-of-law principles.

To prepare the country-specific doctrine, the MMP would employ a range of specialists and practitioners who would be tasked with providing a working doctrine and plan capable of being implemented in a specific conflict environment. The resultant work would describe and explain methodology at the local, regional, and national levels of operation, as well as specific functions, such as the desk system. Other issues, such as procedures for interacting with other security forces, would also be addressed. Finally, the doctrine would provide mentors with phased “goalposts”—measures of effectiveness that are expected to be met at particular stages of MMP implementation.

To ensure its applicability in the field, there should be a specified “doctrine group,” which should include, at an appropriate time, senior members of the HN service. The receipt and incorporation of HN comment within the MMP doctrine process will serve as a significant facilitator for future operational cooperation. Done thoughtfully and honestly, the MMP doctrine quickly becomes “their” doctrine, influenced by foreign and historical experience but authorized by HN practitioners. Additionally, a diverse set of individuals or country experts with experience in the HN culture and others who possess insights into HN dynamics should be called upon for comment. These independent experts, while not necessarily well versed in local intelligence or security practices,

often pose important questions that were ignored during intelligence practitioner discussions of the model and doctrine.

The centrality of doctrine should not infer rigidity. As commanders often discover, their plans and strategies—no matter how intricately planned—are often short-lived once battle begins. No amount of preparation or engagement can ward off problems in application. Therefore, the doctrine is offered as a fluid document, promoting the key qualities of the model in forceful terms but also providing for future edits and revisions as necessitated by events on the ground.

Mentor Personnel

As noted, doctrine plays a key—if not a decisive—role in determining the success or failure of the MMP. This emphasis is somewhat unorthodox. Conventional training programs often suborn doctrinal consideration in favor of simply recruiting those with supposedly attractive skill sets and backgrounds: police can train police, military can train military. This reversal of emphasis does not indicate that the caliber of affiliated personnel should be relegated to an afterthought. The application of the model within the HN context relies heavily on the quality of those assigned to convey it, particularly in the initial stages of the process.

But what specific skills should mentors possess? Optimally, their skills sets and experience would match the level of HN operators they were assigned to mentor: managers' work at national and regional nodes, operators' work at the local level. Individuals assigned to these roles should possess at least several years' experience in the conduct of intelligence operations at varying levels of responsibility (local, regional, and national). The term "intelligence operations" should suggest a very broad range of required skill sets, from individuals skilled as collectors to analysts to those with experience managing intelligence professionals.

Just as important as previous experience, however, is the mentor's ability to convey these experiences and the lessons learned to foreign professionals. This requirement renders personnel with successful prior

mentoring experience particularly valuable. A certain comfort level working in foreign environments and the ability to adapt to foreign cultural traits is highly desirable as well. Additionally, MMP personnel will need to be able to easily communicate with their HN counterparts, requiring in some countries the recruitment of especially skilled interpreters who are willing and prepared to serve in this special capacity for months at a time.

There are advantages to mentors whose military intelligence backgrounds—i.e., their orientation and experience—would help facilitate the integration of MMP capacity within the overall military construct. However, this scenario presupposes a surplus of government personnel with experience in intelligence, cultural interaction, and some types of police work, a dim prospect given contemporary budgets and the demands of ongoing conflicts. This is not a major impediment, however, as contractors or U.S. government civilians are available who possess extensive backgrounds in intelligence or unique forms of police work. If properly trained in the doctrine, they could successfully build the capacity within HN services under the supervision of the U.S. military.

Whatever their backgrounds, the MMP, if sponsored by the military, should always be supervised and managed by a U.S. officer of sufficient rank or stature to successfully represent the program before the U.S. command staff. This figure would serve to ensure that the MMP gains broad acceptance throughout the force, and could reserve operational, logistical, or intelligence support were it required. He or she could also serve as the military “face” of the program, solving disputes with the HN on behalf of both the U.S. military and the MMP.

Possessing this uniformed interlocutor in a conflict environment is critical. One can easily envision a scenario in which mentor personnel require security or vehicles to help mentor HN officers through a sensitive operation. Rather than a civilian or contractor attempting to secure these resources from local commanders—a problematic request for many different reasons—the MMP’s military supervisor can easily interface

with fellow command staffers to reserve the required material support in a coordinated and healthy manner.

Mentoring

Intermittent interface and casual conversation is not sufficient for transferring the sophisticated tenets of the model, particularly as operations against hostile forces begin. In order to fully realize the benefits of the program, the MMP (and their interpreters) must enjoy near constant access to their partner trainees—living, eating, and working alongside them, often in forward operating bases or police stations. Although mentors should *not* participate in HN operations, they should be in a position to observe them through daily planning and debriefings. This proximity allows the mentors to oversee the minutiae of intelligence and security work and offer pertinent, real-time advisory support rather than just theory and generalizations. It also fosters a regular and increasingly comfortable working relationship between HN and MMP personnel, facilitating trust and confidence in other aspects of the model. A paternal but collegial relationship can be expected to develop between HN and MMP personnel.

It is important that these mentoring efforts be executed simultaneously at all three levels of model operations: local, regional, and national. Mentors assigned to these different elements should be able to converse in the details of the doctrine of their respective elements while also maintaining awareness of the doctrine at other levels of the HN structure. Narrow or exclusive partnership at one level of operations will lead to incongruence and a general operational disconnect that can impede force growth for years. Comprehensive engagement of the mentors of the entire model grants MMP and the U.S. military the ability to make structurewide alterations in a relatively expedient and consistent manner.

Even with persistent field mentoring, it is essential to hold regular formal training events in which HN officers are removed from the field for a period of intense instruction. These events ideally would take place soon after the MMP is initiated in order to educate HN trainees as to the scope,

concept, and intention of the program, as well as the degree of HN and U.S. institutional support the model enjoys. These sessions will become even more effective when mentors attend the sessions along with their trainees, allowing a seamless transition from classroom to the field. Just as field mentoring operations are perpetually guided by doctrine, the training curriculum should be formulated and approved beforehand.

As the *raison d'être* of the overall program, mentoring operations should be afforded their own supervisor. That person could be a mentor or former practitioner. While the U.S. military commander will service the day-to-day demands of the program, the MMP should ideally feature an additional general auditor, supervisor, or compliance officer who will track the success or failure of mentoring efforts throughout the program's area of responsibility, in close consultation with military officials. This position would provide U.S. military officers and MMP personnel an "over-watch" capability, allowing them to quickly diagnose and remedy failures as well as to identify successes that can be applied elsewhere.

Command Support and Integration

No matter how well-structured the MMP's doctrine and mentoring system is or how talented its personnel are, a successful mentoring initiative of this scale requires the full support of co-located U.S. and HN military units. To ensure the health of this relationship, the MMP must enjoy broad awareness and support among military commanders and their staffs; sidelining the intelligence function as an ancillary effort initiated and maintained by one component can be damaging to both the MMP and the overall military enterprise. This mutual support is key as HN security service and affiliated trainers will often require logistical and security support from conventional military units, particularly in the beginning. To ensure that such requests are not viewed as disruptive or "extra work," it is important that the military commanders regularly impress the importance of the MMP upon their subordinate commanders.

To engineer and secure the necessary level of institutional support, MMP personnel should be proactive in both promoting the MMP concept

and regularly updating military commanders as to ongoing developments. Training materials, doctrine, and program updates should be regularly briefed to U.S. commanders to ensure a high level of transparency and familiarity. MMP leadership should endeavor to build an accessible electronic clearinghouse for programmatic documents. The MMP should also seek to facilitate connections between U.S. commanders and skilled HN personnel, an effort that would quickly impress upon senior military officials the benefits of continued mentoring.

Broadening the scope of this integration effort, the MMP should also seek out additional partners within the U.S. military presence, interacting and cooperating with the many operational and support components. Enjoying a close relationship with highly trained indigenous security officials, the MMP will have much to offer U.S. military units in terms of information; indeed, the work of integrating the MMP within the overall military structure is not a matter of justifying the value of such measures but of publicizing the benefits to the widest audience of U.S. military and security personnel. This effort should include the facilitation of meetings between U.S. officers and officials and their HN counterparts, meetings that the MMP will stand uniquely capable of arranging due to their working relationship with the HN intelligence service. All such actions should work towards a goal of establishing a close working relationship between the U.S. and the HN security service that is viewed as mutually beneficial by all involved.

One key method by which the U.S. military can bolster the HN force is by selectively sharing information with them, such as data concerning the existence and identities of infiltrators working against the HN security apparatus. A U.S. unit specifically tasked with vetting or co-vetting HN personnel can improve the internal security function of the HN unit. This also serves to protect MMP mentors from hostile or untrustworthy personnel and helps to address problems of local nepotism and cronyism. This U.S. element could initially be responsible for identifying counterintelligence threats facing the local HN service,

working through the MMP and other affiliated U.S. units to make best use of the information.

This outreach activity is in many ways a programmatic imperative; it is likely that the MMP would be executed concurrently with several other initiatives aimed at enhancing conventional military or police capabilities. Without some measure of coordination, these programs can rapidly become competitive, diminishing the overall HN capacity-building effort. Thus, the MMP military coordinator should seek to ensure that the closest possible working relationship be established between MMP and other training programs, optimally within the military's dedicated HN training component. Similar training is occurring, for example, with Afghanistan local and national police and the Afghan National Army, where the U.S. is involved in training units at all levels (national, district, provincial, village) to be able to complete their specific tasks.

Another factor that compels integration is the value of information-sharing agreements. As their capabilities are reinforced through regular instruction and mentoring, it is probable that HN intelligence/police personnel would increasingly gain access to information of importance to the U.S. military. Although the mentoring program is exclusively tasked with building indigenous capability—not serving as “spies” on behalf of the U.S. military—it should not shy away from facilitating intelligence-sharing relationships between U.S. forces and the HN service at the local, regional, and national levels of operations. MMP personnel would stand ready to help broker, guide, and reinforce efforts designed to secure this relationship between the HN force and the U.S. military.

Developing Indigenous Support

Imposing an externally sourced method of operations within the HN is rife with opportunities for miscommunication and error. No matter how quality HN personnel are intricately incorporated in the formulation and execution process, the model will usually be viewed as a foreign idea, at least in the short term. Managed abruptly and unilaterally, the MMP

could lead to a degradation of existing HN capability as well as a general deterioration of the HN relationship with U.S. forces.

Joint formulation and reformulation of doctrine and planning provides an excellent venue for cooperation; however, it is only one of many options. The MMP and its U.S. military advisers must be energetic in engaging with officials at all levels of HN security administration, seeking their formal support as well as the support of their respective agencies. This process should occur as early as possible before program initiation and should continue continually throughout. The signings of joint memorandums and statements of understanding should be emphasized, as formal paper trails may prove important in supporting the MMP over the long term. This campaign of engagement should be conducted with the full cooperation of the American interagency group in the country, allowing for a broader range of indigenous contacts who could be called upon to lend support to the MMP throughout the HN government. Within the HN service, engagement should proceed at all levels of operations while respecting command and control structures. This comprehensive engagement is critical. The opinions and findings of officers at the national level may be radically different from HN representatives operating at lower levels of authority. It is key to understand these different viewpoints during doctrine formulation, rather than have them arise unexpectedly during implementation.

B. Exporting the Capability Without U.S. Military Presence

The second major environment where local dominance can be effective with partner states is regions in which there are few if any U.S. military forces deployed but where the outcome of local struggles is important to U.S. interests. These areas are likely to be relatively new or transitional democracies or adjacent to regions deemed vital to the United States, such as Central America and the circum-Caribbean. They will

usually have limited economic resources and infrastructures and little experience with rule-of-law-oriented policing and intelligence.

After identifying a priority fragile state in which the United States seeks to bolster the local intelligence capability, the U.S. first needs to persuade the Host Nation that, with U.S. assistance, the HN can enhance its local intelligence in a manner consistent with rule-of-law principles. This will take considerable sensitivity and skill by U.S. diplomats, soldiers, and others. It will require securing the support of the senior HN leadership. Their agreement is essential as to which of their specific services will be trained to be the lead agency to manage and carry out this function.

Developing indigenous capacity to achieve intelligence dominance consistent with rule-of-law principles in these areas will require many of the same capabilities that are required in areas where U.S. military forces are the “badge and gun.” It will, however, require U.S. officials to use military and civilian diplomatic and entrepreneurial skills in sovereign countries that do not seek any U.S. conventional military presence. The U.S. will work with the selected services and adapt the dominance doctrine, prepare an operational plan, select the sites, and prepare U.S. and foreign contractors to mentor locals over a period of one to three years. This will ensure that the HN is empowered to obtain the local intelligence that it needs and that the U.S. wants to receive.

To begin with, there is a need for U.S. professionals familiar with the model. This unit would have the authority and budget to assist selected foreign democracies or subregions that conclude that their current capabilities do not provide them with the requisite local knowledge to fulfill their security requirements and that they are interested in developing their own local intelligence. Assuming that there are ten or more countries or parts of countries that may seek such capabilities in the future, a permanent U.S. team of professionals would be required—commanders, country managers, mentor leaders, trainers, analysts, evaluators, and IT specialists. Such a unit would be required for at least five to ten years, as it

would take a minimum of three to five years in any given country or region to develop and institutionalize the dominance capacity.

The permanent U.S. team would also need to hire contractors as mentors, interpreters, IT specialists, and so forth. While the permanent unit would almost certainly need to be cleared U.S. personnel, the mentors could be vetted U.S. citizens or foreigners.

The U.S. unit, operating under U.S. interagency direction and oversight, would first have to identify appropriate host country units with which to partner. The likely choices would be the HN security service, police, army, or some combination of HN agencies. It might be a sub-state unit in a province of the country. There are advantages and disadvantages to dominance capacity building in each of these bureaucracies. In general, police forces have the most access to the local street, as well as a direct connection to the judicial system; the domestic security service often has competence in clandestine tradecraft and is connected to their own and other foreign services; the military has a high degree of competence in various skill sets.

However, one size does not fit all contingencies. Among the most important variables in selecting partner agencies to be considered are the following:

1. The HN's services leadership perspective and preferences—are they going to be supportive and provide human and material resources for the project?
2. The competence and integrity of the leadership of particular HN agencies—do they have competent and honest professional managers and staff?
3. The particular irregular warfare challenges in the country, such as the particular terrain where the armed groups are operating or the transnational operations of the groups, and how local dominance can be effective in the region.

It is important for the U.S. to conduct its own assessment of the particular challenges in the Host Nation. The next step would be to

transform the model of dominance presented above to a draft concept of operations (CONOPS)—principles, phased operational plan, budget, timeline, milestone—for this specific HN. The CONOPS should be developed in cooperation with the HN, which must to be on board. Then an MOU/MOA can be negotiated.

The U.S. and the HN would jointly adapt the doctrine. As appropriate, they would together prepare logistical equipment and arrangements, vet the personnel teams for local units, and develop regional and national TCGs (or their equivalents). They would also brief other elements of the HN security establishment whose assistance is required (e.g., the military, prison service, border police) to ensure HN that resources would be forthcoming. After that, they would begin the selection of specific regional and local boundaries for the units and select and prepare the mentor teams.

Preparing the country assessment and CONOPS and negotiating an MOA could very well take six months. Another six months could be required for the subsequent marshaling and vetting of personnel, adaptation of the doctrine and logistical arrangements, and training of HN personnel before the system becomes operational. Six months later, the system could be expected to produce significant, measurable intelligence.

It will be essential to do this in a number of countries and regions. To accomplish this, intelligence dominance needs to be embedded in at least one of the U.S. foreign assistance programs. This will require authorities and budget.

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